NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION AFFIRMS HUDSON COUNTY TRIAL COURT’S DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOLLOWING THE JURY’S NO CAUSE VERDICT IN CEPA WHISTLEBLOWING CASE
By Elizabeth M. Trottier, Esq., Davison Eastman Munoz Paone, P.A.
On September 29, 2025, in Chapman v. Alaris Health, LLC, Docket A-2855-23, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed a Hudson County trial court denying Plaintiff a new trial after the jury found a no cause verdict in her case alleging her former employer Defendant Alaris Health, LLC and Alaris Health at Hamilton Park (“Alaris”) violated the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8.
The issue on Plaintiff’s appeal was whether the trial court should have allowed for a new trial where the jury was not charged with “constructive discharge” even though the case was litigated pre-trial and at trial on the premise that Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated, not constructively discharged. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial finding that there was no miscarriage of justice.
The facts of the case involved a certified nursing assistant (CNA) who worked in an Alaris nursing home at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in March and April 2020. Plaintiff was concerned she may have contracted COVID-19 from being exposed to unmasked individuals in the facility. Although Plaintiff was asymptomatic for COVID-19, her doctor provided her with a note to self-quarantine until she received test results two weeks later.
Alaris’ Director of Nursing informed Plaintiff that the note was unacceptable, and she would have to accept Plaintiff’s resignation. Plaintiff responded that she was self-isolating, not resigning. Plaintiff called Alaris’ HR Staffing Coordinator and Plaintiff claimed that the HR Staffing Coordinator confirmed she had been fired. Plaintiff’s doctor saw her via telehealth and wrote a note excusing her from work for another month due to medical incapacity as a result of anxiety. Alaris sought more information from Plaintiff, but Plaintiff did not respond. One week later, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging she had been wrongfully terminated in violation of CEPA.
Alaris invited Plaintiff to return to work and confirmed she was still an active employee, and the facility needed her as a CNA. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging retaliation and violations under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). Plaintiff did not plead constructive discharge.
During trial, and prior to the jury being charged, Plaintiff sought to charge the jury with constructive discharge, but the trial court denied the request. The jury returned a no cause verdict in favor of Alaris. The jury determined that the employer Alaris did not discharge the plaintiff in violation of public policy and did not violate the CEPA.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial arguing that the jury should have been charged with constructive discharge. The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion, finding that the case was litigated pre-trial and at trial on the premise that she was wrongfully terminated, not constructively discharged. Plaintiff never argued she was abandoning her employment. A constructive discharge jury charge did not even conform to the evidence presented at trial where plaintiff testified twenty-five (25) times that she was fired and had not resigned. Furthermore, the Plaintiff could not meet the high legal standard for constructive discharge. To prove a constructive discharge under CEPA, and citing Donelson v. DuPont Chambers Works, 206 N.J. 243, 257 (2011), the working conditions must be so intolerable that a reasonable person subject to them would resign rather than continue to endure them. The court further reasoned that not every employment action that makes an employee unhappy constitutes an actionable adverse action, and the phrase “intolerable conditions” conveys a sense of outrage, coercion and unconscionability. Here, there were no allegations of intolerable working conditions.
Plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court. The Appellate Division found that the trial court properly rejected plaintiff’s request to charge the jury with constructive discharge, and that the Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial because there was no miscarriage of justice. Had the trial court allowed for a last-minute new trial theory of constructive discharge, and the jury charged on the issue of constructive discharge, the defendants would have been deprived an opportunity to defend against it and therefore prejudiced.
If you are a company or a professional faced with a complaint of discrimination, retaliation or wrongful termination and you seek assistance with any of the aforementioned, please contact the Employment Law Group of the law firm of Davison Eastman Munoz Paone, P.A. at 732.462.7170 or [email protected].
THIS IS FOR INFORMATIONAL PURPOSES ONLY AND DOES NOT CREATE AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP. THIS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL ADVICE.
